

John C. Strandholm

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Education

Ph.D. Economics, Washington State University, expected June 2017.

Dissertation: "Pollution Abatement R&D Investment Under Different Market Structures and Regulatory Regimes"

Advisor: Ana Espínola-Arredondo

M.S. Economics, University of Wyoming, 2013.

Thesis Title: "Tax and Subsidy Incidence in Private Negotiations"

Advisor: Owen R. Phillips

B.A. Mathematics, University of Wyoming, 2011.

Research Interests

Primary: Environmental Economics, Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics

Secondary: Game Theory, Applied Econometrics

Working Papers

Strandholm, John C. and A. Espínola-Arredondo, "Spillover Effects of Green Technology Investment in the Face of Entry," 2016 (in submission, **Job Market Paper**).

Strandholm, John C., A. Espínola-Arredondo, and F. Muñoz-García, "Regulation, Free-Riding Incentives, and Investment in R&D with Spillovers," 2016 (in submission).

Phillips, Owen R., B.R. Cook, J.C. Strandholm, C.T. Bastian, and D.J. Menkhaus, "Experimental Tests on Tax and Subsidy Incidence in Negotiations," 2016.

Works in Progress

Strandholm, John C., "Incentives to Invest in Green Technology Under Different Policies: Quotas vs. Fees," 2016.

Berry, Kevin, A.R. Delmond, R. Morin-Chasse, J.C. Strandholm, and J. Shogren, "Social Preferences and Institution Types," 2015.

Teaching Experience

Instructor

EconS 425 – Industrial Organization, Spring 2016 – First half of course

EconS 572 – Master’s Microeconomic Analysis II, Fall 2015 – First half of course

Teaching Assistant, Washington State University

EconS 311 – Econometrics, Fall 2015, Fall 2016, Spring 2017 – Responsible for weekly lab sessions – Overall teaching evaluations: 4.4 (Fall 2016) and 4.2 (Fall 2015) out of 5

EconS 311 – Econometrics, Spring 2015 - Fall 2015 – Global Campus (online) development

EconS 500 – Macroeconomic Theory I, Fall 2014

EconS 425 – Industrial Organization, Spring 2014

EconS 330 – Natural Resource Economics, Fall 2013

Research Assistant for Dr. Owen R. Phillips, University of Wyoming, Fall 2012 - Spring 2013

Teaching Assistant, University of Wyoming

ECON 1200 – Economics, Law, and Government, Fall 2011 - Spring 2012

Lectures

EconS 500 – Macroeconomic Theory I, Fall 2014 – two lectures

ECON 1200 – Economics, Law, and Government, Fall 2011 - Spring 2012 – two lectures

Presentations

"Spillover Effects of Green Technology Investment in the Face of Entry" presented at:

Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (AERE) special session at Western Economic Association International (WEAI) conference, Portland, OR. June 29 - July 3, 2016.

Washington State University School of Economic Sciences Seminar Series. December 9, 2016.

The 12th Conference of the Spanish Association for Energy Economics, Salamanca, Spain. February 2-3, 2017 (presented by co-author).

The First Catalan Economic Society Conference, Barcelona, Spain. May 26-27, 2017 (presented by co-author).

Professional Service

Book Reviews:

Advanced Microeconomic Theory: An Intuitive Approach with Examples, Félix Muñoz-García, The MIT Press, Forthcoming, 2016.

Game Theory, in the WSCP reference of natural resources and environmental policy in the era of global change, World Scientific Publishing Company (WSPC)/Imperial College Press (IPC). Editors: Ana Espínola-Arredondo, and Félix Muñoz-García. Expected 2016.

Committee Membership:

Student Experience Advisory Council (SEAC) at Washington State University, College of Agricultural, Human, and Natural Resource Sciences (CAHNRS).

Scholarships and Awards

Cory Walters and Lia Nogueira Scholarship, Washington State University, 2016

Rocky Mountain Power Graduate Scholarship in Economics, University of Wyoming, 2011

Joseph C. and Katherine A. Drew Scholarship, University of Wyoming, 2011

Joe and Arlene Watt Scholarship in Honor of Elliott Hays, University of Wyoming, 2011

Professional Membership

Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (AERE), Western Economic Association International (WEAI), American Economic Association (AEA)

Computer Languages

Mathematica, MATLAB, STATA, R, L^AT_EX

References

Dr. Ana Espínola-Arredondo
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Dr. Jill McCluskey
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Dr. Félix Muñoz-García
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Dr. Vicki McCracken (teaching reference)
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Abstracts

Strandholm, John C. & A. Espínola-Arredondo, "Spillover Effects of Green Technology Investment in the Face of Entry," 2016 (in submission).

Abstract:

This paper analyzes an entry-deterrence model in which the incumbent decides whether to invest in research and development (R&D) that promotes clean technology. We consider the case in which the entrant could benefit from a technology spillover. We show that if the costs of R&D and the initial spillover are low, an increase in the spillover or probability of successful R&D increases the investment in R&D. In addition, higher levels of the spillover or probability of successful R&D make entry more attractive compared to a standard entry game. The results also suggest that if the spillover is low and/or pollution inflicts minor damage on the environment, no entry is socially optimal. Finally, from a policy perspective, when there is entry and pollution is present, the regulator should focus efforts on promoting technologies with a high probability of success instead of technologies with high spillover effects.

Phillips, Owen R., B.R. Cook, J.C. Strandholm, C.T. Bastian, and D.J. Menkhaus, "Experimental Tests on Tax and Subsidy Incidence in Negotiations," 2016 (in submission).

Abstract:

The general concept of liability side equivalence (LSE) theory is experimentally tested in a market institution where trades are negotiated. Without any tax or subsidy policy buyers earn relatively more than sellers. Buyers and sellers are impacted differently by tax and subsidy policy. We believe much of this difference lies with reference points buyers and sellers have when they negotiate. Taxes and subsidies change reference points and as a consequence bargaining behavior. Subsidies tend to weaken bargaining stances, while taxes do not necessarily make traders more stubborn. LSE predictions are not robust.

Strandholm, John C., A. Espínola-Arredondo, and F. Muñoz-García, "Regulation, Free-Riding Incentives, and Investment in R&D with Spillovers," 2016.

Abstract:

In this paper, we analyze a duopoly market with investment in abatement technology under two regulatory regimes. This is done using a three-stage game where firms invest in a green technology with spillover effects in the first stage, the regulator sets the emission fee in the second stage, and production of the polluting good and utilization of the green technology occur in the third stage. We analyze the game under two different regulatory regimes: (1) each firm faces the same emission fee (uniform fee), and (2) each firm faces an emission fee dependent on the investment in green technology (type-dependent fee). Firms can differ through their costs of investing in the abatement technology (asymmetric efficiency). We obtain that social welfare is unambiguously higher under the type-dependent regime than otherwise. In addition, we find that the asymmetry in efficiency of investment affects firms' profits, identifying cases for which a uniform regime generates higher profits than a type-dependent regime. This result predicts that a regulator should expect to observe firms' opposition to a specific regulatory regime depending on their costs of investing in R&D and the spillover effect of such an investment.