



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Research in Social Stratification and Mobility

journal homepage: <http://www.elsevier.com/locate/rssm>



Military service and the socioeconomic attainment of French men, 1940–1980

Q1 Alair MacLean

Washington State University Vancouver, 14204 NE Salmon Creek Ave, Vancouver, WA 98686, United States

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 21 November 2018

Received in revised form 13 February 2019

Accepted 26 February 2019

Available online xxx

Keywords:

Military service

Social stratification

Life course

Inequality

ABSTRACT

Many previous researchers have evaluated how the socioeconomic trajectories of American men were shaped by military service across different eras. However, few have explored how these pathways may have varied in other geographic contexts, assessing the lives of veterans of other countries. This article applies theories derived from the American case to evaluate the socioeconomic progress of veterans across four decades in France. It uses data from the Formation, Qualification Professionnelle (FQP) surveys of 1977 and 1985, which include information provided by men who were eligible to serve during the historical period stretching from World War II through the late-1970s, a period during which the French armed forces were involved in wars in both Indochina and Algeria. In brief, the findings show that these men enlisted in the armed forces on the basis both of family background and of educational attainment in consistent fashion across the four decades. Veterans appear to have worked in slightly different occupations from non-veterans, though this variation stems partly from measured pre-service differences between the two types of men.

© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Q2 Many previous researchers have evaluated the causes and consequences of military service in the United States. Some have assessed whether men enlisted in the military due to selection on the basis of family and individual characteristics since the Civil War of the 1860s (Bernstein, 1990; Carlson & Andress, 2009; Kriner & Shen, 2010). According to this research, men joined the armed forces on the basis of their own academic potential and educational achievement, as well as their family background, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the era in which they became eligible to serve (e.g., MacLean & Parsons, 2010). Men were positively selected, for example, into the armed forces during World War II and negatively selected during other periods (e.g., Angrist, 1990; Teachman, Call, & Segal, 1993).

Other researchers have assessed not the characteristics of those who served, but how military service may have affected US veterans. Scholars have evaluated these effects among those who served as far back as in the years stretching from the Civil War of the 1860s and as recently as the contemporary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Institute of Medicine, 2010). According to this research, veterans have had worse outcomes than non-veterans after serving in, for

example, the Civil War, but better outcomes after serving during World War II (Lee, 2005; Teachman & Tedrow, 2004).

Taken together, these findings suggest that the associations of military service and socioeconomic standing before and after enlistment in the U.S. varied across time periods. Indeed, the life course principle of time and place suggests that social phenomena, such as military service, should vary historically and geographically (Elder & Johnson, 2002).

Yet relatively few scholars have evaluated how these relationships may differ geographically, exploring the lives of veterans in countries other than the U.S. There are apparently only five articles, for example, that explore the impact of service on socioeconomic attainment in France (Avrillier, Hivert, & Kramarz, 2010; Herpin & Mansuy, 1995; Keller, Poutvaara, & Wagener, 2009; Keller, Poutvaara, & Wagener, 2010; Maurin & Xenogiani, 2007). This lack of research is surprising for two reasons. First, many scholars attribute the development of the system of conscription, or mandatory service, in developed countries to the *levée en masse* that was initiated during the French revolution of 1789, which, they argue, led to a shift from wars conducted by professional armies to those waged by citizens (Flynn, 2002; Wimmer, 2013). Second, France engaged in wars throughout the modern era, most recently in Algeria, where the numbers of soldiers and casualties were nearly as high as those of the United States in Vietnam (Stora, 1997; Stora & Quemeneur, 2012).

E-mail address: alair.maclean@wsu.edu

This article contributes to previous research by examining selection into service in France, and the association with later socioeconomic attainment among the men eligible to serve during the four decades between 1940 and 1980. It proceeds in the following fashion. The first section presents theory derived from decades of research on military service in the United States. It first describes factors assumed to shape selection into service, focusing on how those who serve in the armed forces differ from those who do not. It then explains how service may have shaped the later lives of veterans. The next section describes the historical context of military service in France in the middle part of the twentieth century, along with the findings of the few articles that have explored questions related to how time spent in the armed forces shaped veterans' socioeconomic attainment in that country. The article then presents the data and methods, followed by the findings. It concludes by reviewing the implications of the research for theory regarding the role of military service in different geographic and historical contexts, as well as limitations, and directions for future research.

In brief, the analyses show that French men enlisted in the military in consistent fashion between 1940 and 1980, primarily reflecting military screening, which excluded lower status men. There is also some evidence of class bias in which some men were protected from service by their greater educational resources. In their later lives, veterans had slightly different outcomes from their non-veteran peers, as measured by occupation. While these socioeconomic discrepancies are explained, for the most part, by the veterans' selection into the armed forces on the basis of measured characteristics, there is some evidence that French veterans were less likely than non-veterans to work at the bottom and more likely to work in the lower-middle of the occupational distribution.

2. Theoretical background

Scholars examining military service in the United States have drawn on the life course tradition to develop theoretical predictions regarding the role of service in people's lives. They have argued that service-members differ from civilians due either to class bias or military screening (Appy, 1993; Carlson & Andress, 2009). They have suggested that the armed forces shape people's lives by providing a positive turning point or a negative disruption (MacLean, 2010; Sampson & Laub, 1996). Yet other scholars have argued that these apparent relationships stem not from service itself but from selection (Small & Rosenbaum, 2008). More recent work has drawn on the theory of generations to suggest that veterans have had diverse experiences both before and after service depending on the era during which they came of age (MacLean & Kleykamp, 2016; Mannheim, [1927] 1952).

2.1. Who serves?

This article builds on theory that suggests that men enlisted in the armed forces due to class bias. According to this narrative, men experience service as a negative event that exposes them to the risks of injury and death (Kriner & Shen, 2010). Further, they see that it removes them from the civilian labor force, diminishing their later attainment (Avrillier et al., 2010). According to this view, men avoided service if they grew up in higher-status families, leaving those from less privileged backgrounds to take on this responsibility. They were less likely both to serve and to fight in wars if they grew up in families with greater socioeconomic resources (Appy, 1993; MacLean, 2008). During the draft era in the US, for example, men evaded conscription by enrolling in college (Fallows, 1975; Flynn, 1993). As a result, they were less likely to serve if they came from higher-status families (Fallows, 1975). Scholars have argued

that enlistment in the United States was governed by class bias even during times when service was mandatory. They have asserted that such bias governed service as far back as the Civil War of the 1860s and as recently as the contemporary era when the United States has engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Bernstein, 1990; Kriner & Shen, 2010).

This article extends this research and theory to test whether class bias existed during the final decades of conscription in France. The class bias argument is primarily based on observations derived from the United States, where military service has often been seen as a burden (Flynn, 2002). Such bias therefore may not apply in France, where military service was viewed during the years of conscription as an honor, or at least an integral part of citizenship (Boëne, 2003; Flynn, 2002). Nevertheless, the article tests the following hypothesis:

Class bias hypothesis. French men were less likely to enlist if they grew up in socioeconomically privileged families.

It may be that service is not governed, or at least not solely, by class bias, as the armed forces reject recruits in ways that may exclude not those at the top, but rather those at the bottom of the socioeconomic distribution. The screening narrative observes that the armed forces select men to serve on the basis of desired characteristics, such as health and cognitive ability, rejecting men who fall below certain cutoffs (Nam, 1964; National Research Council, 2006; Yoakum & Yerkes, 1920). These characteristics are often correlated with socioeconomic status. Men have greater physical well-being and score higher on cognitive tests, for example, if they grew up in higher-status families (Alexander, Entwistle, & Olson, 2007; Palloni, 2006). According to this view, when the armed forces apply physical and cognitive standards, they disproportionately exclude men who grew up in lower-status families. Indeed, U.S. veterans were less likely than non-veterans to have dropped out of high school in all eras (Carlson & Andress, 2009). The theory may also apply to the militaries of other countries, as long as they screen and reject recruits. This chain of reasoning leads to the following prediction:

Screening hypothesis. French men were less likely to enlist if they grew up in socioeconomically disadvantaged families.

2.2. Consequences of military service

In addition to examining the characteristics of men who enlist, previous scholars have assessed whether time spent in the armed forces affects veterans' lives after their service. They have alternately reasoned that service shifts the trajectories of veterans' lives, either positively or negatively, or that it simply replicates the pre-service characteristics of those who serve. In the 1980s, researchers posited that military service disrupted the transition to adulthood, leading men to have lower attainment than they would have otherwise (Hogan, 1981). In the United States, white veterans, for example, were more likely to experience service as a disruption that led to lower earnings (Teachman & Tedrow, 2007). They may have had experiences in the military that are not as highly valued by employers as civilian experience. The article therefore tests the following prediction:

Disruption hypothesis 1. French veterans have lower attainment than non-veterans later in their later work lives.

Scholars have argued that service involving combat, in particular, affects people's lives negatively. According to this view, people may experience long-term consequences of negative events, such as wartime service, throughout their adult lives, which would be consistent with "scarring" (Gangl, 2006; MacLean, 2010). This theory has been associated with the theory of aging that says that initial disadvantages tend to cumulate over time (Ferraro, Shippee,

& Schafer, 2009). Veterans suffer physical injuries or psychological wounds, which could, in turn, lead them to have more difficulties later in the labor market (MacLean, 2010; Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008). According to this view, combat potentially affects all who serve negatively.

Scholars have also argued for a moderated form of this theory, in which people are negatively affected by combat if they grew up in families that provide them with fewer advantages. Disadvantaged veterans may have fewer resources to draw on after they leave the armed forces, and therefore suffer more than their higher-status counterparts from military service and combat exposure (Nayback, 2008). These observations suggest the following prediction:

Disruption hypothesis 2. French veterans have lower attainment than non-veterans later in their later work lives if they served during wartime, particularly if they grew up with fewer advantages.

Scholars have also explored the extent to which men's lives have been affected by service positively. They have developed a view of service that suggests that people benefit from features of service that make it a "bridging environment" or "turning point." They have focused these arguments on people from less privileged backgrounds, suggesting that military service has a moderated effect (Teachman & Tedrow, 2004). After the Second World War, for instance, scholars suggested that the military might serve as a bridging environment, "knifing off" previous experience and leading less privileged men to have more positive outcomes than they would have otherwise (Brotz & Wilson, 1946). According to this narrative, soldiers may learn skills that they would not otherwise have obtained, as well as make social connections that they would not otherwise have made (Elder, Gimbel, & Ivie, 1991; Sampson & Laub, 1996). Military service thus shifts people's lives in a positive direction, particularly those who come from disadvantaged backgrounds (Elder et al., 1991; Sampson & Laub, 1996). Alternatively, employers may view military service as a signal of being able to complete a sustained commitment and consequently reward veterans with higher pay (Berger & Hirsch, 1985; De Tray, 1982). This chain of reasoning leads to the following prediction:

Turning point hypothesis. French veterans have higher attainment than expected if they grew up in more disadvantaged families.

Scholars have also explored the possibility that any apparent association between military service and later outcomes stems not from the experience itself, but from the characteristics that men bring to the armed forces, which could explain the appearance of either a negative disruption or a positive turning point (Angrist & Krueger, 1994; Small & Rosenbaum, 2008). If men appear to suffer after service as predicted by the disruption hypothesis, they could have been selected into service on the basis of characteristics that explain their lower attainment. Veterans may appear to have worse outcomes in their later lives, for example, if they were more likely than non-veterans to have grown up in lower-status families. Thus, they would have had less socioeconomic success even had they not served. This argument overlaps with the view of service, discussed earlier, as reflecting class bias. Indeed, Vietnam veterans have long appeared to have worse outcomes than their non-veteran counterparts (Angrist, 1990; Card, 1983). Yet men could evade service during the Vietnam war by attending college, which could have led those who did not serve to earn more on average than those who did.

Alternatively, if veterans appear to benefit, they may have been selected into the military on the basis of characteristics that would lead to greater achievement. This argument could overlap with the screening hypothesis. Men may appear to have better outcomes after they leave the military because those with less promise were excluded from the armed forces. Veterans of World War II appear to benefit, for example, at least partly because they were

positively selected into the armed forces (Angrist & Krueger, 1994; Small & Rosenbaum, 2008). Men were excluded from the military in this era primarily because they were unhealthy. Scholars have demonstrated an association between socioeconomic attainment and health, with some arguing that more income or wealth leads to better health, and others demonstrating the reverse (Elo & Preston, 1996; Palloni, 2006). Thus, veterans could appear more successful because they were healthier on average than non-veterans before they served. This research and theory leads to the following prediction:

Selection hypothesis. A negative or positive association between service and later attainment will be explained by the pre-service characteristics of men.

2.3. Historical variation before and after service

It may also be that either pre- or post-services differences between veterans and non-veterans vary over time, as suggested by the theory of generations (Mannheim, [1927] 1952). In this vein, theorists have argued that historical change stems from shifts in the factors that shape lives. Scholars have extended this perspective to the concept of cohorts, meant to indicate a group of people who experience a life event at the same time, defined by birth years, for instance, or by years when they began college or enlisted in the armed forces (Ryder, 1965). Life course scholars have similarly argued that lives are shaped by their location in time and place (Elder, 1974; Elder & Johnson, 2002). According to work in this vein, for example, women have experienced increases in labor force attainment not as a consequence of period effects shaping the lives of all women simultaneously, but because women in younger cohorts have more opportunities than those who are older (Campbell & Pearlman, 2013; Morgan, 1998).

The theory has more recently been applied to military service. Indeed, research suggest that the types of people who serve in the military and the trajectories of their lives may vary historically (MacLean & Kleykamp, 2016). In the United States, there were historical differences in both the types of men who went into the military and the associations of their service with later socioeconomic attainment. Black men were excluded from service, for example, during the Second World War, but served at disproportionate rates after the end of the draft in 1973 (Segal & Segal, 2004). In the United States, veterans appear to have benefited socioeconomically if they served during World War II, but to have suffered if they served in the Vietnam War era (Smith, Marsh, & Segal, 2012). These findings suggest shifts in the factors influencing either or both who served and how service shaped their later lives. This theory and research leads to the following hypotheses:

Generations hypotheses. The associations between military service and pre-service characteristics or post-service outcomes vary by cohort.

3. Military service in France

This article applies the preceding theory and research to the socioeconomic causes and consequences of military service in France in four decades near the end of the draft era. The French military recruited soldiers by means of a draft during the two centuries between 1789 and 1997, with the exception of the early 1940s (Flynn, 2002). Starting in the late 1970s, as the Cold War lessened the need for large standing armed forces, France, along with the rest of the countries of Europe, began to shift to all-volunteer forces, abolishing mandatory service beginning in 1996 (Boëne, 2003; Martin, 1981). In 1997, France switched from a system of compulsory national service to a voluntary system similar to those

already established several decades earlier in the United States and the United Kingdom (Flynn, 2002).

During these centuries, the French commonly referred to military service simply as “national service,” reflecting the fact that such service was intended to be universal (Flynn, 2002). In practice, as in other countries, women were not subject to being drafted. Men became eligible to serve when they turned 18. Similar to the United States, however, France occasionally provided men with exemptions if they were students or starting a family, which led to questions about the fairness of conscription (Flynn, 2002). During the bulk of that time, military service was seen as a way to unify the country in the centuries between the revolution and the late 1980s (Boëne, 2003). As a consequence, French service was presented not as a burden but rather as an honor bestowed on citizens (Martin, 1981).

In the four decades between 1940 and 1980, France engaged in three wars, during two of which men enlisted at high rates. During much of World War II, the country was occupied by Germany and thus could not operate an independent military (Flynn, 2002). After D-Day in 1944, French forces fought on the side of the Allies. Following that war, they battled communist forces in the Indochinese peninsula between 1946 and 1954. In the Indochina war, the French forces were composed not of conscripts, but of professionals. During those years, therefore, French men who were drafted did not often see combat (Flynn, 2002). As that war was coming to an end, France was drawn into a war to retain control of its colony, Algeria. This colonial war began in November of 1954 and ended in the summer of 1962. Many of the French men who were drafted during these years were sent to fight (Stora & Quemeneur, 2012). That war resembles the U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the number of men who were sent overseas to fight, with nearly as many French men fighting and dying in Algeria as did American men in the later war (Stora, 1997).

Few researchers have examined the role of military service in French men’s lives, primarily focusing on those who became eligible to serve in the armed forces in the two decades immediately before and after the end of the conscription in France, the 1980s and 1990s. Little is known therefore about those who were drafted during the preceding centuries.

Previous scholars have produced mixed findings, suggesting negative, positive, and neutral associations of French military service with socioeconomic outcomes. According to this research, conscription appears to have been positively associated with college enrollment in France, though benefiting not those who enlisted but rather those who avoided service. Among those who were eligible to serve in the late 1990s, men attained more years of schooling if they were born in years that made them eligible to serve before the end of the draft than if they were born after that date (Maurin & Xenogiani, 2007; Mouganie, 2015). They could delay conscription by enrolling in college. They thus likely attained more education because they were trying to avoid serving in the armed forces. This finding suggests that French veterans may have attained fewer years of schooling than non-veterans. It supports the disruption hypothesis.

Researchers have produced mixed findings regarding the association between service and earnings in France, with evidence of either negative or neutral associations. According to one article, non-veterans earned more than veterans due to their higher average education when they evaded the draft, particularly if they grew up in families with lower status (Maurin & Xenogiani, 2007). Indeed, men appeared to view military service as interrupting their careers (Avrillier et al., 2010). These findings further suggest that military service in France was a disruption.

Yet other research suggests that French veterans of the draft era did not differ from non-veterans socioeconomically. According to this work, men did not have higher earnings if they came of

age during the draft era than if they became eligible to serve after that era despite having higher average education (Mouganie, 2015). Veterans also had similar rates of career mobility as did non-veterans if they were born in the 1960s and thus were eligible to serve during the 1980s when conscription was still in effect (Herpin & Mansuy, 1995). These findings suggest that French veterans did not differ from non-veterans, at least among these cohorts eligible to serve during the later years of conscription.

Researchers examining the impact of conscription at the macro-level, however, have found negative associations with socioeconomic outcomes across a range of countries, including France. Among 21 OECD countries observed between 1960 and 2000, citizens had lower income and their earnings increased by smaller amounts if they lived in countries that recruited servicemen through a draft than if they lived in countries with voluntary service (Keller et al., 2009). They were also less likely to enroll in higher education when they lived in the countries where they were subject to conscription (Keller et al., 2009). These findings suggest that conscription is negatively associated with socioeconomic attainment and may have disrupted men’s lives in nations that conducted a draft, including France.

4. Data and methods

4.1. Data

To deepen understanding of military service in France during the draft era, the analyses use data on French veterans drawn from the 1977 and 1985 surveys of Formation, Qualification Professionnelle (FQP), which were designed to measure intra- and inter-generational mobility among French men (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, 1977; Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, 1985). In order to focus on the work life, the sample is limited to men between the ages of 25 and 57 who reported valid occupations. The potential samples include 17,131 respondents in 1977 and 16,412 respondents in 1985. In 1977, the sample is missing data on at least one of the independent variables, primarily father’s education, in 1021 cases. In 1985, it is missing data on one or more of these measures in 781 cases. Data are multiply imputed on the independent variables using chained equations and ordinal or multinomial logistic regressions for the categorical data. Descriptive statistics are reported for the non-imputed data (Allison, 2002; StataCorp, 2015a).

The analyses focus on a measure of military service that is treated first as a dependent variable in models predicting enlistment and then as the primary independent variable in models predicting occupational attainment. This measure is derived from questions asking about military service, namely the years in which men started and stopped serving. These questions are used to construct variables that reflect whether men served in the military or not, as well as to construct variables that capture the eras during which they served.

In the models predicting socioeconomic attainment, the outcome measure is based on the original French occupational categories reflecting the respondent’s current or most recent job (Seys, 1986). Respondents are included if they are in the selected age range, with approximately 3 percent reporting being unemployed and looking for work, and another 2 percent reporting not currently employed for other reasons. This information is combined with that from questions about the type of establishment and the number of employees to allocate respondents to one of 11 class categories developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe, which have been used to compare mobility across European countries (Connelly, Gayle, & Lambert, 2016; Vallet, 2004). The transformation of French occupational categories to the cross-national categories

was performed as described by (Vallet, 2004). For the purposes of the current set of analyses, the class categories are further reduced from 11 to 5: 1 = White collar workers; 2 = Petty bourgeoisie; 3 = Farm workers; 4 = Skilled manual workers; 5 = Unskilled manual workers (Connelly et al., 2016). Results using codes with more categories do not lead to substantively different conclusions. These categories are also used in the measure of fathers' occupation, which is based on a question that asked about the work performed by the fathers when the respondents finished their education.

Education is based on a variable that asked the respondents to report the degree they earned. This variable is then transformed into the CASMIN codes, which contain 9 categories, ranging from inadequately completed general education to higher tertiary education, allowing for comparisons across countries (Vallet, 2004). The analyses use a condensed version of the educational attainment measure with the following 4 categories: 1 = less than primary education; 2 = primary education; 3 = secondary education; 4 = tertiary education. Analyses with the more detailed categories do not produce substantively different results. These categories are also used in the measure of the father's highest degree completed.

Age is reported by the respondent at the time of the survey and is used to construct two variables. The first variable reflects the respondents' age at the end of education. It is obtained by first subtracting the calendar year the respondent reported finishing their education from the year of the survey. Then this difference is subtracted from the respondents' age at the time of the survey. The second variable is a binary measure of whether the respondents completed their education by age 20, the median age at which men began to serve in the armed forces. In addition, the analyses include another variable that reflects the age at which military service began among veterans. This measure is calculated by subtracting the birth year from the year at which service began.

The age variable is also used to produce a variable reflecting cohort. In order to compare veterans to non-veterans, men are allocated to categories that reflect eras during which they turned 20 years old. They are then assigned to the following cohorts: 1 = World War II (1940–1945); 2 = Indochina War (1946–1953); 3 = Algerian War (1954–1962); 4 = sixties (1963–1969); 5 = early seventies (1970–1974); and 6 = late seventies (1975–1980).

4.2. Methods

The first set of analyses examines selection into military service using logistic regression models in which the dependent variable is whether the man ever served in the armed forces. The analyses test for differences across the two survey years using Chow tests. Variables are entered sequentially into the model, beginning with cohort, adding family background, and finally incorporating the respondent's own education. This portion of the analyses tests the class bias and screening hypotheses. The analyses also test the generations hypothesis, which predicts differences across cohorts, by comparing models with and without interactions using BIC statistics.

The second set of analyses examines occupational attainment, with multinomial logistic regression models, in which the dependent variable is the 5-category occupational variable. These analyses test the first disruption hypothesis. As with the preceding analyses, the models test for differences across survey year with a Chow test. In this case, the model also tests for interactions between the military service variable and all of the other independent variables, using BIC statistics, to see if the impact of these variables is moderated by military service. In evaluating evidence of interactions by family background and cohort, this portion of the analysis tests the second disruption and turning point hypotheses, as well as the generations hypothesis. Given the known difficulties in interpreting coefficients from logistic models, the analyses are

presented with caution (Ai & Norton, 2003; Breen, Karlson, & Holm, 2018).

The analyses are conducted in Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2015b). In all cases the predicted probabilities and marginal effects are estimated using the "mimrgns" and "marginsplot" commands to help with interpretation.

5. Findings

Table 1 provides detail regarding the family background and educational attainment of veterans and non-veterans by survey year, suggesting that men were not negatively, but positively selected into the French armed forces based on both their own and their fathers' educational attainment. The patterns are similar across survey years. Veterans differed from non-veterans in their paternal education. Their fathers were much less likely than those of non-veterans to have left school without at least a primary credential. Less than half of veterans had fathers in this category, while at least half of non-veterans did. For the most part, veterans resembled non-veterans in terms of the occupations performed by their fathers. In the 1977 survey, veterans were slightly less likely than non-veterans to report that their fathers worked on farms. In 1985, they were slightly less likely to report that their fathers worked as unskilled manual laborers.

According to the table, veterans themselves had higher education and, to a lesser extent, occupational attainment than non-veterans. On average, veterans and non-veterans completed their education between 3 and 4 years before they turned 20, the average age at which men enlisted. More than four-fifths of both types of men had completed their education by that age. Thus, educational differences between veterans and non-veterans may more appropriately be seen as preceding than as following military service, at least among these French men who became eligible to serve in the mid- to late-20th century. Veterans were less likely than non-veterans to be in the lowest educational category and more likely to have either a primary or a secondary credential. They were, however, less likely to report the highest level of education, a tertiary degree. These findings suggest a curvilinear relationship between respondents' education and military service, with men at the bottom and top of the distribution less likely than those in the middle to enlist. According to both surveys, veterans were more likely to work in skilled and less likely to work in unskilled manual occupations. According to the 1985 survey but not the 1977 one, they were also more likely to work in white collar jobs.

These descriptive differences likely mask historical change among the cohorts covered by the analysis. The following two figures therefore present variation across cohorts in military service and educational attainment using data pooled across both surveys. **Fig. 1** shows the rates of service by the year the men turned 20.



Fig. 1. Rates of service among French men by year turned 20.

Table 1

Descriptive statistics of men between the ages of 25–57 by military service and survey (weighted).

	1977		1985		
	Non-veterans	Veterans	Non-veterans	Veterans	
Father's years of education	9.20 (2.18)	9.34 (2.25)	**	9.48 (2.45)	9.55 (2.39)
Father's education					
Less than primary	0.55	0.46	***	0.50	0.42
Primary	0.28	0.35	***	0.27	0.34
Secondary	0.13	0.15	**	0.18	0.19
Tertiary	0.04	0.04		0.05	0.05
Father's occupation					
White collar	0.16	0.16		0.18	0.19
Petty bourgeoisie	0.14	0.15		0.13	0.14
Farm workers	0.30	0.27	***	0.23	0.23
Skilled manual	0.20	0.21		0.26	0.27
Unskilled manual	0.20	0.21		0.19	0.17
Years of education	10.14 (4.13)	10.77 (3.31)	***	11.21 (4.33)	11.52 (3.18)
Respondent's education					
Less than primary	0.38	0.27	***	0.33	0.21
Primary	0.29	0.30		0.19	0.23
Secondary	0.23	0.35	***	0.35	0.46
Tertiary	0.10	0.08	***	0.13	0.10
Occupation					
White collar	0.29	0.30		0.31	0.34
Petty bourgeoisie	0.08	0.09	*	0.09	0.09
Farm workers	0.10	0.10		0.07	0.07
Skilled manual	0.31	0.34	***	0.30	0.34
Unskilled manual	0.22	0.17	***	0.22	0.15
Age	41.03 (10.83)	40.04 (9.32)		37.88 (8.85)	40.57 (9.53)
Age at end of education	15.89 (4.71)	16.74 (3.53)	***	16.97 (4.94)	17.53 (3.35)
Completed education by age 20	0.87	0.89	***	0.82	0.86
Military cohort (year turned 20)					
World War II (1940–1945)	0.30	0.13	***	–	–
Indochina (1946–1953)	0.18	0.29	***	0.14	0.20
Algeria (1954–1962)	0.13	0.24	***	0.13	0.22
Sixties (1963–1969)	0.20	0.20	***	0.22	0.19
Early-1970s (1970–1974)	0.19	0.13	***	0.42	0.30
Late-1970s (1975–1980)	–	–		0.10	0.09
Age at enlistment					
	20.43 (1.66)				20.33 (1.67)
Observations	4030	12,066		3923	11,706

Source: Formation, Qualification Professionnelle 1977 and 1985.

* p < 0.05.

** p < 0.01.

*** p < 0.001.

Among those who turned this age after the start of the Second World War, men served at relatively low rates. They had the lowest rate of service, less than 40 percent, if they came of age in 1945. After the end of the war, these rates increased to over 80 percent. They stayed at this level among men who came of age between 1946 and 1963, the period encompassing the wars in Indochina and Algeria. After the end of these wars, rates of service declined slightly and fluctuated around 75 percent among men who came of age between the mid-1960s and the late-1970s.

Fig. 2 presents educational attainment by the year in which the respondents came of age. The top line describes the share of veterans who successfully completed primary education, which gradually rose from below 80 percent to above 80 percent. Veterans were more likely than non-veterans to achieve this level of education in all cohorts. Yet, the educational gaps are smallest among those who turned 20 in the World War II era and again among those who came of age in the late 1970s. Men experienced a steeper increase in the shares who achieved secondary credentials. Among veterans, this share rose from below 40 percent to nearly 80 percent. As with primary education, veterans had an educational advantage over non-veterans in all years. The respondents also saw increases in the shares who earned tertiary degrees, which




Fig. 2. Education among French men by year turned 20 and veteran status.

rose from less than 10 percent to around 20 percent of the sample. At this level of educational attainment, non-veterans held an advantage over veterans in several, but not all, years. These trends contradict the expectation that veterans suffered lower educational

Table 2

Military service among French men age 25–57 years old in 1977 and 1985 FQP surveys.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Military cohort (ref: Indochina War [1946–1953])					
Second World War (1940–1945)	−1.367*** [0.0517]	−1.378*** [0.0519]	−1.377*** [0.0519]	−1.411*** [0.0526]	−1.394*** [0.0555]
Algerian War (1954–1962)	0.161*** [0.0458]	0.150** [0.0460]	0.148** [0.0460]	0.0998 [0.0465]	0.147** [0.0504]
Sixties (1963–1969)	−0.472** [0.0411]	−0.514*** [0.0415]	−0.520*** [0.0416]	−0.612** [0.0425]	−0.553** [0.0468]
Early-1970s (1970–1974)	−0.790*** [0.0402]	−0.843*** [0.0407]	−0.851*** [0.0408]	−0.972** [0.0421]	−0.965** [0.0458]
Late-1970s (1975–1980)	−0.619*** [0.0685]	−0.676*** [0.0690]	−0.687*** [0.0692]	−0.819*** [0.0706]	−0.859*** [0.0771]
Fathers' education (ref: Less than primary)					
Primary		0.407*** [0.0325]	0.405*** [0.0336]	0.275*** [0.0352]	0.252*** [0.0349]
Secondary		0.322*** [0.0372]	0.316*** [0.0416]	0.220*** [0.0441]	0.230*** [0.0506]
Tertiary		0.138* [0.0568]	0.154* [0.0654]	0.180** [0.0696]	0.141 [0.113]
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)					
White collar		−0.0402 [0.0491]	−0.0331 [0.0504]	0.0172 [0.0574]	
Petty bourgeoisie		−0.0154 [0.0480]	−0.0396 [0.0485]	0.000226 [0.0526]	
Farm workers		−0.072 [0.0407]	−0.00697 [0.0412]	−0.00925 [0.0426]	
Skilled manual		0.0443 [0.0419]	0.0358 [0.0423]	0.0243 [0.0441]	
Respondents' education (ref: Less than primary)					
Primary			0.524*** [0.0375]	0.518*** [0.0379]	
Secondary			0.797** [0.0365]	0.838*** [0.0378]	
Tertiary			0.219** [0.0487]	0.606*** [0.131]	
Survey year, 1985	−0.0119 [0.0290]	−0.0132 [0.0291]	−0.017 [0.0292]	−0.0297 [0.0295]	−0.0452 [0.0331]
Constant	1.538*** [0.0331]	1.371*** [0.0353]	1.395*** [0.0441]	1.075*** [0.0470]	1.068*** [0.0492]
N	33,543	33,543	33,543	33,543	27,775

Standard errors in brackets.

* $p < 0.05$.** $p < 0.01$.*** $p < 0.001$.

attainment as a consequence of their service. Yet military service may have competed with education at the highest level.

5.1. Predictors of French military service

The following section evaluates the factors associated with military service in a multivariate context based on statistical tests that indicate that the predictors did not differ across survey years or cohorts. The analyses first conduct Chow tests of the differences in the coefficients from the models predicting veteran status across survey years. The test statistic is not significant, indicating that there was no evidence of a difference in these coefficients ($\chi^2(13) = 16.97, p = 0.20$). Therefore, these models are not presented separately by survey year, but include a variable reflecting the survey year.

The analyses also tested for interactions between the cohort variable and the other independent variables. These models are not preferred according to BIC statistics (see Table A1), indicating that the relationships did not strongly vary depending on when men became eligible to serve. The results are therefore presented without these interactions.

Table 2 presents results drawing on pooled data from the 1977 and 1985 FQP surveys in logistic models predicting military service. According to the table, the era during which a man became eligible to serve is an important predictor of whether he enlisted

in the armed forces. As suggested by the descriptive statistics, men were more likely to join the military if they came of age during the Indochinese and Algerian wars, and least likely if they came of age during the Second World War.

Net of these cohort differences, parental education is associated with enlistment in curvilinear fashion, with those whose fathers achieved education in the middle parts of the distribution most likely to enlist, and those at the bottom and top less likely to do so. Model 4 introduces the respondents' own education and shows a similar curvilinear relationship, with those in the middle of the distribution most likely to enlist, and those at the top and bottom relatively less likely to do so, in this case net of both cohort and family background characteristics. Men were most likely to enlist if they themselves attained a secondary credential, more likely than those who received a primary education, who were, in turn, more likely than those who did not receive this credential. As with paternal education, men were more likely to enlist if they themselves received a tertiary degree than if they had no degree, but less likely to do so than if they had either a primary or secondary credential. As suggested by the descriptive statistics, there is no association between father's occupation and odds of service.

Model 5 limits the sample to men who had completed education by the age of 20. This model reinforces the patterns shown earlier, though men who completed a tertiary degree by this young age were more likely than those with just a primary credential to




Fig. 3. Predicted probability of enlisting by father's education.

enlist. These findings are consistent with an account that says that the armed forces excluded men with lower status. They therefore support the screening hypothesis. But they also partly support the class bias hypothesis, according to which men were able to evade service if they grew up in families with more resources, possibly by substituting higher education.

Fig. 3 presents predicted probabilities of enlisting by father's education. The probabilities in the left-hand panel are derived from a model with just paternal education, which resembles the bivariate associations contained in Table 1. The probabilities in the right-hand panel are derived from a model that includes most of the other covariates with the exception of respondent's own education. Across both panels, men enlisted on the basis of fathers' education in curvilinear fashion. They were more likely to enlist if they grew up with fathers who had education in the lower middle of the distribution. They were least likely to enlist if their fathers' had less than a primary education, the lowest level of attainment.

Fig. 4 contains predicted probabilities of enlisting by the respondents' own education with the same general format as the preceding figure. In addition to the other covariates, the probabilities on the right-hand side are net of father's education and occupation. Net of family background, men had different probabilities of enlisting based on their own educational attainment, with those at the bottom and top less likely than those in the middle to enlist. As with fathers' education, men had the lowest probability of enlisting if they were at the bottom of the educational distribution. They had the greatest probability of enlisting if they were in the middle. It is likely that those at the bottom were excluded by military screening, while those at the top may have evaded service by using their education as a competing activity that kept them from joining the armed forces.




Fig. 4. Predicted probability of enlisting by respondent's education.

5.2. French service and later occupational attainment

656

This section explores the relationship between military service and later occupational attainment and provides evidence of a disparity in the socioeconomic attainment of veterans compared to non-veterans that is partly explained by their pre-service characteristics. As with the models of military selection, the analyses first test to see if the results vary by survey year. According to the Chow test, there is evidence of a difference in the coefficients in models predicting occupational attainment across survey years ($\chi^2(56) = 154.85, p = 0.0000$). Therefore, the article presents these models separately by survey year and highlights these contrasts.

657

In order to test whether the associations of military service with occupational attainment differed historically or socially, the analyses also test models containing interactions between military service and the other independent variables. None of these models fit better according to BIC (see Table A1). In addition, relatively few of the interactions are statistically significant, which suggests that military service had a direct association with occupational attainment, rather than a moderated one (see Tables A2 and A3, which extend the models in Tables 3 and 4).

666

Table 3 shows that, according to the 1977 survey, military service was associated with occupational attainment, but this relationship was partially explained by family background and educational attainment. (See Table A4 for the same set of models estimated not with the 5-category, but with the 7-category measure of occupation.) According to model 1, net of disparities by cohort, veterans were more likely than non-veterans to perform white collar jobs than unskilled manual labor. They were also more likely to be classified as petty bourgeoisie, farm workers, or skilled manual laborers. As shown in model 2, this association is partly explained by the family backgrounds of the two types of men, most notably in the case of white collar workers. These relationships are less strongly connected to class characteristics among the petty bourgeoisie and skilled manual workers. And veterans were more likely than would be predicted based on their family background to work on farms. When respondents' own education is included in model 3, however, the associations with socioeconomic attainment decline still further, suggesting that, in some cases, it is not military service per se, but rather the different levels of education held by the veterans and non-veterans that explain their apparently divergent occupations. Nevertheless, the occupational differences between veterans and non-veterans remain in the different odds of working on farms and in skilled manual jobs compared to unskilled manual positions.

675

Building on these findings, Fig. 5 portrays the marginal effects of service on working in the different occupational categories derived from the 1977 data. The left-hand panel is drawn from an unadjusted model. According to this model, veterans faced a greater

686




Fig. 5. Average marginal effects of service on occupational categories in 1977.

Table 3

Multinomial logistic regressions for 1977 FQP data (reference category: Unskilled manual).

	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Model 1				
Military service	0.301*** [0.0532]	0.393*** [0.0744]	0.238** [0.0725]	0.399*** [0.0552]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)				
World War II	0.259** [0.0778]	0.063 [0.100]	0.149 [0.0952]	0.0122 [0.0801]
Algerian War	0.255*** [0.0690]	-0.0912 [0.0896]	-0.551*** [0.0949]	0.107 [0.0698]
1960s	0.664*** [0.0682]	0.149 [0.0881]	-0.341*** [0.0929]	0.167* [0.0707]
Early 1970s	0.0302 [0.0758]	-0.877*** [0.118]	-0.580*** [0.104]	0.133 [0.0751]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary				
Secondary				
Tertiary				
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
White collar				
Petty bourgeoisie				
Farm workers				
Skilled manual				
Intercept	0.354*** [0.0630]	-0.673*** [0.0844]	-0.437*** [0.0812]	0.282*** [0.0644]
N	17,131			
Model 2				
Military service	0.198*** [0.0586]	0.319*** [0.0771]	0.264*** [0.0773]	0.334*** [0.0564]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)				
World War II	0.227** [0.0844]	-0.00454 [0.104]	0.165 [0.101]	-0.0000922 [0.0814]
Algerian War	0.214** [0.0749]	-0.0994 [0.0927]	-0.609*** [0.0997]	0.112 [0.0711]
1960s	0.415*** [0.0739]	0.0546 [0.0914]	-0.276** [0.0990]	0.0608 [0.0723]
Early 1970s	-0.276*** [0.0831]	-0.986*** [0.122]	-0.451*** [0.112]	-0.0365 [0.0772]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	1.128*** [0.0591]	0.760*** [0.0748]	0.652*** [0.0776]	0.516*** [0.0574]
Secondary	1.843*** [0.0996]	1.097*** [0.119]	0.774*** [0.168]	0.785*** [0.0993]
Tertiary	3.184*** [0.331]	1.887*** [0.367]	1.531** [0.537]	1.134** [0.349]
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
White collar	1.434*** [0.107]	1.032*** [0.147]	0.387 [0.267]	0.504*** [0.114]
Petty bourgeoisie	0.941*** [0.0937]	2.003*** [0.114]	0.914*** [0.212]	0.265** [0.0923]
Farm workers	-0.507*** [0.0730]	0.303** [0.106]	2.982*** [0.147]	-0.501*** [0.0699]
Skilled manual	0.375*** [0.0773]	0.437*** [0.113]	0.123 [0.211]	0.424*** [0.0718]
Intercept	-0.565*** [0.0848]	-1.655*** [0.118]	-2.804*** [0.163]	0.113 [0.0787]
N	17,131			
Model 3				
Military service	0.0181 [0.0646]	0.09 [0.0795]	0.180* [0.0784]	0.145* [0.0583]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)				
World War II	0.240** [0.0895]	-0.0628 [0.106]	0.137 [0.102]	-0.0546 [0.0828]
Algerian War	-0.0751 [0.0810]	-0.264** [0.0952]	-0.652*** [0.101]	-0.00823 [0.0730]
1960s	-0.227** [0.0812]	-0.313** [0.0953]	-0.374*** [0.102]	-0.230** [0.0751]
Early 1970s	-1.037*** [0.0926]	-1.537*** [0.127]	-0.586*** [0.118]	-0.460*** [0.0817]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	0.684*** [0.0649]	0.447*** [0.0779]	0.527*** [0.0793]	0.264*** [0.0600]
Secondary	1.115*** [0.106]	0.700*** [0.124]	0.712*** [0.174]	0.456*** [0.103]
Tertiary	1.943*** [0.348]	1.403*** [0.380]	1.489** [0.538]	0.748* [0.357]

Table 3 (Continued)

	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
White collar	1.084*** [0.116]	0.923*** [0.151]	0.297	0.412*** [0.117]
Petty bourgeoisie	0.657*** [0.101]	1.917*** [0.117]	0.863*** [0.212]	0.190* [0.0943]
Farm workers	-0.371*** [0.0816]	0.447*** [0.110]	3.032*** [0.147]	-0.404** [0.0732]
Skilled manual	0.351*** [0.0828]	0.434*** [0.115]	0.105	0.419*** [0.0736]
Respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	1.107*** [0.0718]	0.904*** [0.0855]	0.425*** [0.0778]	0.720*** [0.0588]
Secondary	2.700*** [0.0823]	2.080*** [0.0967]	0.874*** [0.107]	1.654*** [0.0739]
Tertiary	6.430*** [0.505]	3.688*** [0.524]	2.112*** [0.585]	3.171*** [0.512]
Intercept	-1.318*** [0.0982]	-2.069*** [0.127]	-2.964*** [0.166]	-0.155 [0.0832]
N	17,131			

Source: Formation, Qualification Professionnelle 1977. Note: Standard errors in brackets.

* $p < 0.05$.

** $p < 0.01$.

*** $p < 0.001$.

Table 4

Multinomial logistic regressions for 1985 FQP data (reference category: Unskilled manual).

	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Model 1				
Military service	0.428*** [0.0544]	0.460*** [0.0763]	0.151 [0.0806]	0.498*** [0.0570]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)				
Algerian War	0.238** [0.0833]	0.244* [0.107]	-0.260* [0.114]	0.16 [0.0869]
1960s	0.419*** [0.0839]	0.287** [0.109]	-0.687*** [0.127]	0.255** [0.0879]
Early 1970s	0.273*** [0.0739]	0.00335 [0.0983]	-0.308** [0.101]	0.274*** [0.0768]
Late 1970s	-0.555*** [0.0949]	-1.210*** [0.157]	-0.854*** [0.139]	-0.190* [0.0955]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary				
Secondary				
Tertiary				
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
White collar				
Petty bourgeoisie				
Farm workers				
Skilled manual				
Respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary				
Secondary				
Tertiary				
Intercept	0.583*** [0.0741]	-0.704*** [0.101]	-0.427*** [0.101]	0.267*** [0.0776]
N	16,412			
Model 2				
Military service	0.330*** [0.0587]	0.411*** [0.0779]	0.0586 [0.0866]	0.447*** [0.0577]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)				
Algerian War	0.204* [0.0884]	0.258* [0.109]	-0.322** [0.120]	0.155 [0.0877]
1960s	0.218* [0.0892]	0.250* [0.111]	-0.669*** [0.133]	0.175* [0.0889]
Early 1970s	-0.0961 [0.0794]	-0.0924 [0.101]	-0.205 [0.109]	0.119 [0.0783]
Late 1970s	-1.087*** [0.104]	-1.390*** [0.161]	-0.545*** [0.153]	-0.418* [0.0979]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	1.084*** [0.0661]	0.489*** [0.0804]	0.786*** [0.0868]	0.531*** [0.0624]
Secondary	1.640*** [0.0866]	0.721*** [0.113]	0.931*** [0.154]	0.644*** [0.0902]
Tertiary	2.726*** [0.262]	1.411*** [0.297]	1.962*** [0.423]	0.813*** [0.282]

Table 4 (Continued)

	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
White collar	1.417*** [0.105]	0.682*** [0.140]	-0.142 [0.292]	0.195 [0.107]
Petty bourgeoisie	0.802*** [0.0968]	1.463*** [0.117]	0.422 [0.242]	-0.0857 [0.0981]
Farm workers	-0.241** [0.0813]	-0.0404 [0.109]	2.916** [0.167]	-0.417** [0.0747]
Skilled manual	0.382*** [0.0765]	0.239* [0.105]	0.0388 [0.208]	0.207** [0.0710]
Respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary				
Secondary				
Tertiary				
Intercept	-0.376*** [0.0966]	-1.307*** [0.128]	-2.561*** [0.189]	0.163 [0.0919]
N		16,412		
Model 3				
Military service	0.158* [0.0653]	0.174* [0.0805]	-0.052 [0.0887]	0.268*** [0.0598]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)				
Algerian War	-0.0479 [0.0947]	0.124 [0.112]	-0.351** [0.121]	0.0479 [0.0896]
1960s	-0.303** [0.0965]	-0.061 [0.115]	-0.747*** [0.136]	-0.083 [0.0914]
Early 1970s	-0.874*** [0.0876]	-0.568*** [0.106]	-0.328** [0.115]	-0.271*** [0.0817]
Late 1970s	-1.856*** [0.117]	-1.950*** [0.167]	-0.718*** [0.161]	-0.883*** [0.104]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	0.519*** [0.0736]	0.12 [0.0842]	0.619*** [0.0902]	0.240*** [0.0657]
Secondary	0.861*** [0.0963]	0.312** [0.118]	0.798*** [0.159]	0.315*** [0.0944]
Tertiary	1.404*** [0.277]	0.864** [0.303]	1.579*** [0.429]	0.366 [0.286]
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
White collar	1.048*** [0.113]	0.562*** [0.142]	-0.17 [0.290]	0.0904 [0.110]
Petty bourgeoisie	0.499*** [0.105]	1.335*** [0.120]	0.352 [0.243]	-0.195 [0.101]
Farm workers	-0.252** [0.0889]	0.00414 [0.111]	2.946*** [0.168]	-0.391*** [0.0771]
Skilled manual	0.351*** [0.0830]	0.236* [0.107]	0.0299 [0.208]	0.204** [0.0733]
Respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	1.224*** [0.0827]	0.885*** [0.0982]	0.477*** [0.1000]	0.572*** [0.0679]
Secondary	2.619*** [0.0814]	1.924*** [0.0959]	0.964*** [0.107]	1.512*** [0.0687]
Tertiary	6.192*** [0.362]	3.501*** [0.383]	1.882*** [0.442]	2.846*** [0.368]
Intercept	-1.138*** [0.112]	-1.674*** [0.137]	-2.774*** [0.192]	-0.0318 [0.0963]
N		16,412		

Source: Formation, Qualification Professionnelle 1985. Note: Standard errors in brackets.

* p < 0.05.

** p < 0.01.

*** p < 0.001.

probability than non-veterans of working in skilled occupations, while they faced a lower probability of working in unskilled manual positions. The right-hand panel presents these associations net of all the covariates. Net of cohort, family background, and respondents' education, veterans continue to face a lower odds than would be expected of working in unskilled manual and a higher odds than would be expected of working in skilled manual positions.

Table 4 contains the same series of models, but this time derived from the 1985 survey, according to which the associations between veteran status and occupations are stronger and more persistent than they appear in the 1977 survey. (See Table A5 for the same set of models estimated not with the 5-category, but with the 7-category measure of occupation.) The point estimates are larger in

the first model, with similar patterns, with skilled jobs being the most likely occupation held by veterans relative to non-veterans followed by petty bourgeois and white collar positions. Veterans were still more likely than non-veterans to work on farms than in unskilled manual occupations, though this association is smaller than those with the other occupational categories, likely due to the relative decline in farming overall. As in the 1977 survey, parts of these associations are explained by including family background measures, with the point estimates smaller in model 2 than in model 1, but still relatively large. Net of family background, veterans were more likely than non-veterans to work in skilled than in unskilled manual positions. In the final model, veterans continue to be more likely than non-veterans to work in skilled manual, petty




Fig. 6. Average marginal effects of service on occupational categories in 1985.

bourgeois, and white collar occupations than in non-skilled manual positions, net of their educational characteristics. These results suggest that military service was associated with later socioeconomic attainment. The contrasting findings derived from the two surveys, however, suggest that the answer may depend on the year the question was asked.

Extrapolating from these results, Fig. 6 depicts the same set of models as Fig. 5. As shown in Table 4, the results are less influenced by pre-service characteristics. Veterans faced greater odds than did non-veterans of working in skilled and lower odds of working in unskilled manual occupations. This latter result persists net of differences in cohort, family background, and respondents' own educational attainment.

6. Conclusion

Between the Second World War and 1980, French men joined the military in curvilinear fashion. During those decades, they enlisted if they had resources in the middle of the status distribution. They were least likely to serve if they or their fathers had the lowest levels of education. To a lesser extent, they were also less likely to serve if they were at the top of these distributions.

Taken together, these findings support the screening and class bias hypotheses. They suggest that the elite and the poor were less likely than the middle class to enlist. They are consistent with the narrative of military screening, which predicted that the armed forces exclude men at the bottom of the socioeconomic distribution. Lower-status men were likely excluded from the armed forces because educational resources are a proxy for health. Unfortunately, the respondents were not asked about their health, nor were workers asked about whether they were disabled. The results also provide weak evidence of the class bias hypothesis, with men at the top of the educational distributions slightly less likely to serve.

Previous theory suggested that military service constituted a negative disruption or a positive turning point in men's lives, or simply reflected selection. Indeed, scholars had provided evidence that was mostly consistent with the disruption and selection narratives in France, demonstrating negative or neutral associations of military service with socioeconomic attainment (Herpin & Mansuy, 1995).

The preceding analyses suggest a more nuanced view of French service. Among these generations who came of age between the Second World War and the 1970s, military service was neither wholly negative nor entirely positive, but rather had a curvilinear relationship to socioeconomic attainment in men's lives. Previous scholars have tended to focus on average earnings and years of education, which may have obscured the curvilinear nature of the relationships. After service, the curvilinear relationship persisted, with veterans less likely than non-veterans to work in

positions at the very bottom and more likely to work in those in the lower-middle of the occupational distribution. Veterans of that era thus had slightly more positive occupational outcomes than non-veterans in their later lives. Rather than a turning point or a disruption, service provided French men with a slight upgrade in status, providing them with an occupational safeguard or buffer.

Yet the findings also partly support the selection narrative. These occupational discrepancies at least partly stemmed from pre-service differences in family and educational resources.

The preceding findings may differ from those of previous research regarding France because the context of service changed over time. Previous researchers have focused on the men who served toward the end of conscription, in the 1980s and 1990s. The current analyses, by contrast, are apparently the first to examine how the causes and consequences of military varied across a number of cohorts in France. Furthermore, they examine the lives of men who served two to six decades before the end of conscription, during which time service was still viewed as an honor connected with citizenship (Boëne, 2003; Martin, 1981). Higher-status men may have been less likely to try to avoid service during these decades than in later years because it was still viewed relatively positively.

The findings may also differ due to the changing context of education. Across a variety of countries, including France, people completed their education at increasingly older ages as the 20th century progressed. They may have therefore increasingly viewed service as an interruption that more directly competed with higher education.

In addition, the analyses did not support the generations hypothesis. They showed that the socioeconomic correlates of military service in France were more consistent than those in the United States during the decades stretching from World War II through much of the Cold War (MacLean & Kleykamp, 2016). Across the same decades and under a similar method of recruitment, French men did not experience the same fluctuation in the socioeconomic factors associated with service. The lack of evidence consistent with some of the original hypotheses that were drawn from the American case suggests that military service operated differently in France than it did in the United States.

The findings raise the question of why there appears to have been little change in both the predictors and consequences of military service across the six cohorts who became eligible to serve during the four decades under consideration. It may be that when rates of service are relatively high, as they were among most of the cohorts in the preceding analyses, men enlisted unless they were excluded from service by screening. The armed forces may thus appear to be positively selected from the general population. French men served in most of the cohorts in the current analyses at rates similar to those among the cohorts of American men eligible to serve during World War II. It is possible that when service rates dip lower, men are more likely to view service as a burden, and higher-status men therefore evade service as predicted by the theory of class bias.

The analyses face several limitations that should be addressed in future research. They do not directly compare the inhabitants of one country to another. They therefore only suggest how selection and later life outcomes may have varied among French and American service-members. Future research should more directly compare men from these two countries to each other to assess whether the apparent differences persist.

In addition, future research could explore service in other countries during these same decades to see if they resemble the French or the American case. It could assess whether men came to serve as a consequence of screening or class bias and whether veterans of other countries experienced their service as a disruption or turning point, or, as in the preceding analyses, as an occupational upgrade or buffer.

In the end, the article sheds light on the factors influencing military service, an activity that was part of the lives of the majority of French men for more than two centuries. It shows that their engagement in that activity depended in part on their family background and in part on their own achievement. It also provides insight into how this rite of passage was associated with the trajectories of their later lives. It suggests that the socioeconomic correlates of French service were more curvilinear than previously demonstrated, neither predominately negative nor positive, though providing some evidence that time spent in the armed forces provided men with an occupational buffer.

Appendix.

This appendix presents background materials supporting the analyses in the body of the article. It first presents fit statistics in **Table A1**. Next, it presents results from models that extend those in **Tables 3 and 4** in two ways. The first set of parallel results includes interactions between the military service variable and the other independent variables. The second set describes results from models in which the dependent variable is a measure of occupation not with five but with seven values.

Table A2 presents multinomial logistic regressions including interactions based on data from 1977. It contains 4 models that build on model 3 in **Table 3**. Along with the interactions and main effects of the selected variables, each model includes the main effects of the other independent variables, which are not shown in the interests of space. Model 4 presents main effects of military service and cohort along with 16 possible interactions between the 2 variables, of which only a quarter are significant. Model 5 presents the interactions between military service and father's education, none of which are significant. Model 6 contains interactions between service and father's occupation, which are also not significant. Model 7 presents similar results regarding the interaction of service with respondent's education.

Table A3 presents a similar set of regressions based on data from 1985. In this case in model 4, in which the cohort is interacted with military service, less than half of the 16 possible interactions are statistically significant. When military service is interacted with father's education in model 5, only 1 of the possible 12 interactions are statistically significant. There are no statistically significant interactions when service is interacted with father's occupation. In model 7, when respondents' education is interacted with

Table A1
BIC statistics for models with interactions.

	df	BIC	Comparison	Diff
Models predicting service				
Model 1: All independent variables	17	33,892		
Models with interactions with cohort				
Model 2: 1 + father's education	32	33,990	2-1	98
Model 3: 1 + father's occupation	37	34,078	3-1	186
Model 4: 1 + respondent's education	32	33,976	4-1	84
Models predicting occupation				
1977 survey				
Model 1: All independent variables	64	38,018		
Models with interactions with military status				
Model 2: 1 + cohort	80	38,153	2-1	135
Model 3: 1 + father's education	76	38,121	3-1	103
Model 4: 1 + father's occupation	80	38,157	4-1	139
Model 5: 1 + respondent's education	76	38,096	5-1	78
1985 survey				
Model 1: All independent variables	64	35,962		
Models with interactions with military status				
Model 2: 1 + cohort	80	36,092	2-1	129
Model 3: 1 + father's education	76	36,062	3-1	100
Model 4: 1 + father's occupation	80	36,099	4-1	137
Model 5: 1 + respondent's education	76	36,056	5-1	94

Table A2

Multinomial logistic regressions for 1977 FQP data (reference category: Unskilled manual).

	Model 4			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Military service	0.175 [0.136]	0.215 [0.157]	0.516*** [0.155]	0.344** [0.121]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)				
World War II	0.360* [0.159]	0.0859 [0.187]	0.512** [0.180]	0.254 [0.144]
Algerian War	-0.134 [0.192]	-0.197 [0.226]	-0.434 [0.234]	0.12 [0.166]
1960s	0.0568 [0.166]	-0.159 [0.198]	-0.0404 [0.203]	-0.0427 [0.152]
Early 1970s	-0.837*** [0.172]	-1.458*** [0.238]	-0.179 [0.212]	-0.342* [0.151]
Military interacted with cohort (omitted: Indochina War)				
World War II	-0.164 [0.194]	-0.229 [0.228]	-0.538* [0.221]	-0.482** [0.178]
Algerian War	0.0547 [0.212]	-0.0885 [0.249]	-0.273 [0.259]	-0.161 [0.185]
1960s	-0.375* [0.190]	-0.211 [0.225]	-0.432 [0.232]	-0.247 [0.174]
Early 1970s	-0.273 [0.202]	-0.106 [0.278]	-0.550* [0.250]	-0.145 [0.177]
Intercept	-1.442*** [0.138]	-2.165*** [0.167]	-3.233*** [0.199]	-0.311** [0.119]
N				17,131
	Model 5			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Military service	0.107 [0.0889]	0.241* [0.112]	0.228* [0.0959]	0.102 [0.0713]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	0.795*** [0.130]	0.668*** [0.160]	0.621*** [0.163]	0.234* [0.118]
Secondary	1.271*** [0.198]	1.020*** [0.236]	0.931** [0.343]	0.312 [0.199]
Tertiary	2.149* [0.725]	1.416 [0.790]	1.637 [1.287]	0.78 [0.748]
Military interacted with father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	-0.149 [0.151]	-0.29 [0.186]	-0.128 [0.191]	0.0365 [0.137]
Secondary	-0.205 [0.227]	-0.415 [0.268]	-0.289 [0.377]	0.178 [0.227]
Tertiary	-0.269 [0.813]	-0.0257 [0.874]	-0.198 [1.378]	-0.0405 [0.830]
Intercept	-1.383*** [0.108]	-2.181*** [0.142]	-2.998*** [0.171]	-0.123 [0.0883]
N				17,131
	Model 6			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Military service	0.0567 [0.128]	-0.0622 [0.189]	-0.249 [0.300]	0.205 [0.111]
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
White collar	1.084*** [0.211]	0.714* [0.285]	0.249 [0.462]	0.273 [0.215]
Petty bourgeoisie	0.654*** [0.195]	1.724*** [0.226]	0.708 [0.373]	0.209 [0.178]
Farm workers	-0.424** [0.159]	0.248 [0.214]	2.680*** [0.256]	-0.306* [0.133]
Skilled manual	0.488** [0.161]	0.537* [0.231]	-0.000886 [0.393]	0.581*** [0.144]
Military interacted with father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
0.00637 [0.238]	0.279 [0.317]	0.071 [0.554]	0.183 [0.238]	
0.00578 [0.222]	0.255 [0.259]	0.224 [0.445]	-0.0225 [0.208]	
0.0727 [0.182]	0.264 [0.240]	0.498 [0.314]	-0.129 [0.152]	

Table A2 (Continued)

	Model 6			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Intercept	-0.188 [0.188]	-0.142 [0.268]	0.158 [0.466]	-0.221 [0.170]
	-1.345*** [0.129]	-1.951*** [0.183]	-2.660*** [0.254]	-0.202 [0.110]
			17,131	
N				
	Model 7			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Military service	0.166 [0.114]	0.245 [0.136]	0.119 [0.104]	0.111 [0.0821]
Respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	1.038** [0.135]	1.079*** [0.160]	0.263 [0.146]	0.768*** [0.108]
Secondary	2.941*** [0.163]	2.314*** [0.192]	0.942*** [0.212]	1.577*** [0.151]
Tertiary	20.22 [787.7]	16.75 [787.7]	15.63 [787.7]	16.38 [787.7]
Military interacted with respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Intercept	0.077 [0.158]	-0.243 [0.188]	0.22 [0.171]	-0.0608 [0.127]
	-0.318 [0.185]	-0.31 [0.216]	-0.0735 [0.235]	0.095 [0.169]
	-14.26 [787.7]	-13.35 [787.7]	-13.88 [787.7]	-13.48 [787.7]
N	17,131			

Note: Model also includes main effects of all other variables. Source: Formation, Qualification Professionnelle 1977. Note: Standard errors in brackets.

* $p < 0.05$.

** $p < 0.01$.

*** $p < 0.001$.

Table A3

Multinomial logistic regressions for 1985 FQP data (reference category: unskilled manual).

	Model 4			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Military service	0.563*** [0.169]	0.608** [0.212]	0.421* [0.203]	0.472** [0.152]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)				
Algerian War	0.0353 [0.217]	0.381 [0.260]	-0.184 [0.268]	0.22 [0.190]
1960s	0.0292 [0.195]	0.317 [0.240]	-0.089 [0.247]	0.127 [0.174]
Early 1970s	-0.468** [0.173]	-0.15 [0.218]	0.113 [0.213]	-0.122 [0.154]
Late 1970s	-1.289*** [0.222]	-1.489*** [0.328]	-0.385 [0.295]	-0.688*** [0.196]
Military interacted with cohort (omitted: Indochina War)				
Algerian War	-0.133 [0.241]	-0.334 [0.289]	-0.234 [0.300]	-0.231 [0.216]
1960s	-0.444* [0.224]	-0.502 [0.273]	-0.939** [0.295]	-0.306 [0.204]
Early 1970s	-0.542** [0.198]	-0.557* [0.246]	-0.605* [0.245]	-0.221 [0.179]
Late 1970s	-0.760** [0.255]	-0.611 [0.376]	-0.44 [0.342]	-0.283 [0.226]
Intercept	-1.447*** [0.166]	-2.010*** [0.210]	-3.138*** [0.240]	-0.178 [0.143]
N	16,412			
	Model 5			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Military service	0.189* [0.0945]	0.128 [0.108]	0.00326 [0.115]	0.242** [0.0785]

Table A3 (Continued)

	Model 5			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	0.666*** [0.138]	0.167 [0.166]	0.809*** [0.173]	0.341** [0.126]
Secondary	0.676*** [0.165]	-0.00955 [0.216]	0.654* [0.298]	0.0459 [0.161]
Tertiary	1.192** [0.412]	0.687 [0.473]	1.770** [0.622]	-0.248 [0.455]
Military interacted with father's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	-0.194 [0.161]	-0.0652 [0.187]	-0.254 [0.199]	-0.133 [0.149]
Secondary	0.27 [0.192]	0.447 [0.241]	0.213 [0.343]	0.379* [0.187]
Tertiary	0.33 [0.522]	0.283 [0.579]	-0.312 [0.780]	0.839 [0.563]
Intercept	-1.161*** [0.122]	-1.642*** [0.146]	-2.812*** [0.199]	-0.0146 [0.102]
N	16,412			
	Model 6			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Military service	0.251 [0.144]	0.0616 [0.183]	-0.35 [0.327]	0.241* [0.119]
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
White collar	1.038*** [0.206]	0.381 [0.264]	0.128 [0.428]	-0.0811 [0.198]
Petty bourgeoisie	0.530** [0.199]	1.137*** [0.225]	0.137 [0.426]	-0.104 [0.183]
Farm workers	-0.259 [0.172]	-0.0127 [0.209]	2.662*** [0.272]	-0.457** [0.141]
Skilled manual	0.558*** [0.157]	0.217 [0.203]	0.131 [0.335]	0.231 [0.133]
Military interacted with father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)				
White collar	0.025 [0.238]	0.25 [0.302]	-0.513 [0.562]	0.231 [0.230]
Petty bourgeoisie	-0.0373 [0.232]	0.26 [0.263]	0.335 [0.517]	-0.115 [0.217]
Farm workers	0.0172 [0.200]	0.0342 [0.245]	0.431 [0.345]	0.0949 [0.167]
Skilled manual	-0.275 [0.185]	0.0204 [0.238]	-0.138 [0.426]	-0.0428 [0.158]
Intercept	-1.210*** [0.146]	-1.593*** [0.179]	-2.581*** [0.271]	-0.0126 [0.119]
N	16,412			
	Model 7			
	White collar	Petty bourgeoisie	Farm workers	Skilled manual
Military service	0.268* [0.129]	0.275 [0.149]	-0.0368 [0.133]	0.319*** [0.0899]
Respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	1.277*** [0.158]	1.067*** [0.184]	0.361 [0.193]	0.683*** [0.127]
Secondary	2.798*** [0.148]	2.042*** [0.174]	1.165*** [0.180]	1.608*** [0.125]
Tertiary	5.316*** [0.398]	2.647*** [0.451]	-0.0464 [0.817]	1.898*** [0.419]
Military interacted with respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)				
Primary	-0.0887 [0.185]	-0.252 [0.217]	0.138 [0.224]	-0.154 [0.150]
Secondary	-0.249 [0.171]	-0.173 [0.201]	-0.273 [0.207]	-0.137 [0.144]
Tertiary	2.506* [1.079]	2.471* [1.108]	3.841** [1.319]	2.607* [1.089]
Intercept	-1.210*** [0.135]	-1.741*** [0.161]	-2.781*** [0.203]	-0.0649 [0.106]
N	16,412			

Note: Model includes main effects of all other independent variables. Source: Formation, Qualification Professionnelle 1985. Note: Standard errors in brackets.

* $p < 0.05$.

** $p < 0.01$.

*** $p < 0.001$.

Table A4

Multinomial logistic regressions for 1977 FQP data, 7-category occupation (reference category: Unskilled manual).

	Model 1					
	Service class	Routine non-manual	Petty bourgeoisie	Farmers	Skilled manual	Agricultural laborers
Military service	0.249*** [0.0589]	0.291*** [0.0763]	0.336*** [0.0770]	0.339*** [0.0804]	0.391*** [0.0580]	-0.312* [0.146]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)						
World War II	0.229** [0.0857]	0.316** [0.111]	0.0706 [0.103]	0.205* [0.103]	0.01 [0.0835]	-0.0147 [0.191]
Algerian War	0.295*** [0.0754]	0.121 [0.101]	-0.112 [0.0928]	-0.592*** [0.104]	0.119 [0.0726]	-0.404* [0.193]
1960s	0.697*** [0.0743]	0.567*** [0.0963]	0.124 [0.0913]	-0.289** [0.100]	0.176* [0.0736]	-0.615** [0.207]
Early 1970s	-0.143 [0.0851]	0.369*** [0.104]	-0.907*** [0.122]	-0.512*** [0.112]	0.13 [0.0779]	-0.996*** [0.248]
Intercept	0.119 [0.0698]	-0.957*** [0.0925]	-0.589*** [0.0873]	-0.652*** [0.0901]	0.306*** [0.0675]	-1.769*** [0.156]
N				16,096		
	Model 2					
	Service class	Routine non-manual	Petty bourgeoisie	Farmers	Skilled manual	Agricultural laborers
Military service	0.141* [0.0654]	0.200* [0.0782]	0.256** [0.0797]	0.323*** [0.0878]	0.329*** [0.0590]	-0.195 [0.148]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)						
World War II	0.187* [0.0940]	0.285* [0.113]	-0.000993 [0.107]	0.167 [0.113]	0.00398 [0.0849]	0.033 [0.193]
Algerian War	0.237** [0.0829]	0.115 [0.103]	-0.12 [0.0960]	-0.651*** [0.112]	0.123 [0.0738]	-0.446* [0.195]
1960s	0.418*** [0.0815]	0.407*** [0.0987]	0.0261 [0.0947]	-0.259* [0.109]	0.0745 [0.0751]	-0.477* [0.210]
Early 1970s	-0.542*** [0.0945]	0.122 [0.107]	-1.044*** [0.126]	-0.429*** [0.124]	-0.0468 [0.0801]	-0.757** [0.252]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)						
Primary	1.253*** [0.0668]	0.857*** [0.0782]	0.749*** [0.0771]	0.628*** [0.0830]	0.510*** [0.0592]	-0.229 [0.184]
Secondary	1.961*** [0.103]	1.194*** [0.120]	1.027*** [0.121]	0.726*** [0.176]	0.749*** [0.101]	-0.439 [0.438]
Tertiary	3.238*** [0.353]	1.918*** [0.377]	1.724*** [0.384]	1.297* [0.542]	1.099* [0.369]	-12.21 [619.2]
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)						
Service class	2.206*** [0.167]	1.423*** [0.186]	1.481*** [0.202]	1.815*** [0.373]	0.783*** [0.170]	0.25 [0.760]
Routine non-manual	1.039*** [0.133]	0.842*** [0.151]	0.780*** [0.175]	0.194 [0.506]	0.361** [0.129]	-0.646 [0.741]
Petty	1.094*** [0.0984]	0.645*** [0.116]	2.032*** [0.115]	1.468*** [0.275]	0.262** [0.0929]	0.315 [0.344]
Farmers	-0.440*** [0.0896]	-0.413*** [0.105]	0.398*** [0.108]	3.932*** [0.218]	-0.556*** [0.0722]	1.161*** [0.219]
Skilled manual	0.474*** [0.0858]	0.271** [0.101]	0.475*** [0.116]	0.22 [0.308]	0.413*** [0.0732]	0.173 [0.290]
Agricultural laborers	-0.957*** [0.166]	-0.697*** [0.181]	-0.108 [0.177]	0.991** [0.325]	-0.294* [0.103]	2.015*** [0.232]
Intercept	-1.016*** [0.0963]	-1.420*** [0.115]	-1.574*** [0.120]	-3.633*** [0.233]	0.136 [0.0815]	-2.677*** [0.243]
N				16,096		
	Model 3					
	Service class	Routine non-manual	Petty bourgeoisie	Farmers	Skilled manual	Agricultural laborers
Military service	-0.019 [0.0752]	-0.012 [0.0805]	0.0416 [0.0822]	0.226* [0.0893]	0.151* [0.0609]	-0.148 [0.149]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)						
World War II	0.267** [0.103]	0.224 [0.115]	-0.0439 [0.109]	0.135 [0.113]	-0.0422 [0.0863]	0.0928 [0.193]
Algerian War	-0.166 [0.0928]	-0.0347 [0.105]	-0.301** [0.0987]	-0.715*** [0.113]	-0.00786 [0.0758]	-0.422* [0.196]
1960s	-0.444*** [0.0929]	0.0617 [0.102]	-0.365*** [0.0989]	-0.395*** [0.113]	-0.231** [0.0781]	-0.399 [0.214]
Early 1970s	-1.591*** [0.109]	-0.388*** [0.113]	-1.634*** [0.131]	-0.629*** [0.132]	-0.495*** [0.0849]	-0.646* [0.259]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)						
Primary	0.765*** [0.0751]	0.580*** [0.0807]	0.451*** [0.0799]	0.485*** [0.0853]	0.275*** [0.0616]	-0.162 [0.186]

Table A4 (Continued)

	Model 3					
	Service class	Routine non-manual	Petty bourgeoisie	Farmers	Skilled manual	Agricultural laborers
Secondary	1.177*** [0.114]	0.856*** [0.123]	0.660*** [0.126]	0.706*** [0.183]	0.443*** [0.105]	-0.354 [0.443]
Tertiary	1.953*** [0.372]	1.523*** [0.386]	1.306*** [0.394]	1.414* [0.555]	0.751* [0.376]	-13.04 [919.7]
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)						
Service class	1.611*** [0.180]	1.266*** [0.190]	1.314*** [0.207]	1.611*** [0.380]	0.649*** [0.175]	0.262 [0.764]
Routine non-manual	0.767*** [0.147]	0.763*** [0.155]	0.697*** [0.179]	0.129 [0.507]	0.293* [0.132]	-0.607 [0.742]
Petty	0.716*** [0.110]	0.559*** [0.119]	1.947*** [0.118]	1.403*** [0.276]	0.187* [0.0952]	0.317 [0.345]
Farmers	-0.306** [0.102]	-0.305** [0.107]	0.540*** [0.111]	3.991*** [0.218]	-0.464*** [0.0743]	1.122*** [0.220]
Skilled manual	0.444*** [0.0955]	0.270** [0.103]	0.475*** [0.118]	0.196 [0.309]	0.412*** [0.0754]	0.164 [0.290]
Agricultural laborers	-0.567*** [0.183]	-0.497*** [0.184]	0.117 [0.180]	1.105*** [0.326]	-0.132 [0.106]	1.962*** [0.233]
Respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)						
Primary	1.214*** [0.0986]	0.937*** [0.0896]	0.864*** [0.0885]	0.515*** [0.0867]	0.675*** [0.0610]	-0.447** [0.169]
Secondary	3.336*** [0.104]	1.909*** [0.101]	2.086*** [0.101]	1.060*** [0.119]	1.647*** [0.0770]	-0.329 [0.276]
Tertiary	7.350*** [0.510]	3.708*** [0.523]	3.722*** [0.525]	2.123*** [0.595]	3.181*** [0.512]	1.307 [1.127]
Intercept	-2.172*** [0.124]	-1.825*** [0.124]	-1.996*** [0.129]	-3.848*** [0.236]	-0.132 [0.0860]	-2.598*** [0.246]
N				16,096		

Source: Formation, Qualification Professionnelle 1977. Note: Standard errors in brackets.

* $p < 0.05$.** $p < 0.01$.*** $p < 0.001$.

Table A5

Multinomial logistic regressions for 1985 FQP data, 7-category occupation (reference category: Unskilled manual).

	Model 1					
	Service class	Routine non-manual	Petty bourgeoisie	Farmers	Skilled manual	Agricultural laborers
Military service	0.487*** [0.0591]	0.344*** [0.0747]	0.467*** [0.0781]	0.259** [0.0882]	0.536*** [0.0590]	-0.182 [0.168]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)						
Algerian War	0.294*** [0.0891]	0.0591 [0.120]	0.252* [0.110]	-0.173 [0.122]	0.173 [0.0901]	-0.812** [0.280]
1960s	0.466*** [0.0896]	0.321** [0.118]	0.296** [0.112]	-0.627*** [0.136]	0.273** [0.0910]	-0.905** [0.290]
Early 1970s	0.266*** [0.0794]	0.423*** [0.103]	0.0302 [0.101]	-0.281** [0.109]	0.317** [0.0795]	-0.277 [0.206]
Late 1970s	-0.919*** [0.109]	0.194 [0.125]	-1.162*** [0.159]	-0.882*** [0.153]	-0.152 [0.0985]	-0.642* [0.282]
Intercept	0.293*** [0.0800]	-0.790*** [0.105]	-0.685*** [0.103]	-0.648*** [0.110]	0.236** [0.0802]	-1.964*** [0.201]
N				15,629		
	Model 2					
	Service class	Routine non-manual	Petty bourgeoisie	Farmers	Skilled manual	Agricultural laborers
Military service	0.388*** [0.0648]	0.280*** [0.0764]	0.423*** [0.0798]	0.117 [0.0968]	0.485*** [0.0598]	-0.145 [0.171]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)						
Algerian War	0.258** [0.0960]	0.0554 [0.122]	0.269* [0.113]	-0.246 [0.131]	0.172 [0.0910]	-0.855** [0.283]
1960s	0.227* [0.0967]	0.207 [0.120]	0.257* [0.114]	-0.614*** [0.146]	0.187* [0.0921]	-0.815** [0.294]
Early 1970s	-0.199* [0.0868]	0.183 [0.106]	-0.0876 [0.104]	-0.221 [0.120]	0.146 [0.0811]	-0.0372 [0.212]
Late 1970s	-1.617*** [0.121]	-0.205 [0.130]	-1.388*** [0.163]	-0.622*** [0.172]	-0.411*** [0.101]	-0.211 [0.291]

Table A5 (Continued)

	Model 2					
	Service class	Routine non-manual	Petty bourgeoisie	Farmers	Skilled manual	Agricultural laborers
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)						
Primary	1.310*** [0.0695]	0.620*** [0.0820]	0.499*** [0.0815]	0.781*** [0.0944]	0.546*** [0.0629]	0.0484 [0.199]
Secondary	1.828*** [0.0928]	0.905*** [0.107]	0.642*** [0.111]	0.912*** [0.167]	0.609*** [0.0903]	0.0692 [0.350]
Tertiary	2.920*** [0.260]	1.159*** [0.287]	1.253*** [0.295]	2.202*** [0.429]	0.807** [0.277]	-13.8 [1050.2]
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)						
Service class	2.017*** [0.149]	1.593*** [0.167]	1.163*** [0.180]	0.206 [0.411]	0.396** [0.152]	0.51 [0.668]
Routine non-manual	1.012*** [0.136]	0.850*** [0.157]	0.22 [0.186]	-0.334 [0.500]	0.0746 [0.133]	-0.286 [0.767]
Petty	0.899*** [0.105]	0.611*** [0.125]	1.457*** [0.118]	0.616* [0.280]	-0.0847 [0.0997]	0.176 [0.474]
Farmers	-0.166 [0.0965]	-0.171 [0.117]	-0.0267 [0.117]	3.416*** [0.203]	-0.467*** [0.0819]	1.672*** [0.303]
Skilled manual	0.487*** [0.0868]	0.406*** [0.103]	0.321** [0.108]	-0.319 [0.283]	0.270*** [0.0744]	0.34 [0.353]
Agricultural laborers	-0.690*** [0.164]	-0.319 [0.181]	-0.208 [0.174]	0.727* [0.321]	-0.367* [0.117]	2.605*** [0.314]
Intercept	-0.893*** [0.108]	-1.296*** [0.130]	-1.288*** [0.130]	-2.990*** [0.225]	0.135 [0.0946]	-3.275*** [0.335]
N				15,629		
	Model 3					
	Service class	Routine non-manual	Petty bourgeoisie	Farmers	Skilled manual	Agricultural laborers
Military service						
	0.281*** [0.0757]	0.0611 [0.0790]	0.191* [0.0826]	-0.0299 [0.0993]	0.311*** [0.0620]	-0.0981 [0.174]
Cohort (omitted: Indochina war)						
Algerian War	-0.0888 [0.106]	-0.0633 [0.124]	0.118 [0.115]	-0.294* [0.132]	0.0558 [0.0930]	-0.827** [0.284]
1960s	-0.465*** [0.108]	-0.0928 [0.123]	-0.0855 [0.118]	-0.740*** [0.149]	-0.0886 [0.0948]	-0.702* [0.297]
Early 1970s	-1.292*** [0.0997]	-0.265* [0.111]	-0.624*** [0.110]	-0.406** [0.129]	-0.283** [0.0849]	0.0994 [0.223]
Late 1970s	-2.813*** [0.141]	-0.728*** [0.138]	-2.034*** [0.170]	-0.886*** [0.182]	-0.934*** [0.108]	-0.135 [0.303]
Father's education (omitted: Less than primary)						
Primary	0.683*** [0.0783]	0.300*** [0.0849]	0.137 [0.0850]	0.572*** [0.0979]	0.270*** [0.0657]	0.107 [0.205]
Secondary	0.963*** [0.104]	0.577*** [0.111]	0.251* [0.116]	0.778*** [0.173]	0.302** [0.0940]	0.115 [0.356]
Tertiary	1.601*** [0.279]	0.775** [0.294]	0.793** [0.302]	1.855*** [0.439]	0.437 [0.283]	-12.98 [689.9]
Father's occupation (omitted: Unskilled manual)						
Service class	1.366*** [0.162]	1.414*** [0.170]	0.960*** [0.184]	0.14 [0.409]	0.224 [0.155]	0.473 [0.668]
Routine non-manual	0.735*** [0.152]	0.758** [0.162]	0.114 [0.191]	-0.402 [0.500]	-0.00869 [0.137]	-0.301 [0.767]
Petty	0.502*** [0.117]	0.483*** [0.128]	1.316*** [0.122]	0.53 [0.281]	-0.203 [0.103]	0.184 [0.474]
Farmers	-0.257* [0.110]	-0.177 [0.120]	-0.0189 [0.119]	3.423*** [0.204]	-0.473*** [0.0846]	1.707*** [0.305]
Skilled manual	0.389*** [0.0972]	0.376** [0.105]	0.290** [0.111]	-0.348 [0.284]	0.243** [0.0768]	0.335 [0.353]
Agricultural laborers	-0.368* [0.183]	-0.174 [0.184]	-0.0389 [0.178]	0.833** [0.322]	-0.250* [0.120]	2.622*** [0.315]
Respondent's education (omitted: Less than primary)						
Primary	1.492*** [0.117]	1.069*** [0.100]	0.918*** [0.102]	0.662*** [0.112]	0.550*** [0.0705]	-0.563* [0.226]
Secondary	3.361*** [0.112]	1.802*** [0.0983]	1.984*** [0.0995]	1.171*** [0.120]	1.512*** [0.0714]	-0.0887 [0.222]
Tertiary	7.330*** [0.371]	3.318*** [0.382]	3.625*** [0.384]	2.018*** [0.451]	2.873*** [0.369]	0.446 [1.075]
Intercept	-2.151*** [0.143]	-1.698*** [0.140]	-1.663*** [0.140]	-3.251*** [0.229]	-0.038 [0.0991]	-3.282*** [0.340]
N				15,629		

Source: Formation, Qualification Professionnelle 1985. Note: Standard errors in brackets.

* p < 0.05.

** p < 0.01.

*** p < 0.001.

military service, there appears to be a consistent interaction between tertiary education and the military service variable, suggesting that these men with who finished tertiary education before serving in the military benefited, as described in the article.

Table A4 presents regressions using the 1977 data and using 7 categories rather than 5. The results of these models are similar to those in **Table 3**, with one exception. In these models, agricultural laborers are separated from farmers. This coefficient suggests that veterans were less likely than non-veterans to work as agricultural laborers than as non-skilled manual workers. This association is no significant in model two, which includes family background. As in the **Table 3**, the primary conclusion to be drawn from model 3 is that veterans are more likely than non-veterans to work as skilled than as non-skilled manual laborers.

Table A5 presents the same set of results for the 1985 data, with similar results.

References

- Ai, C. R., & Norton, E. C. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models. *Economics Letters*, 80(1), 123–129.
- Alexander, K. L., Entwistle, D. R., & Olson, L. S. (2007). Lasting consequences of the summer learning gap. *American Sociological Review*, 72(2), 167–180.
- Allison, P. D. (2002). *Missing data*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Angrist, J. D. (1990). Lifetime earnings and the Vietnam era draft lottery – Evidence from social-security administrative records. *American Economic Review*, 80(3), 313–336.
- Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (1994). Why do World-War-II veterans earn more than nonveterans? *Journal of Labor Economics*, 12(1), 74–97.
- Appy, C. G. (1993). *Working-class war: American combat soldiers and Vietnam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Avrillier, P., Hivert, L., & Kramarz, F. (2010). Driven out of employment? The impact of the abolition of national service on driving schools and aspiring drivers. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 48(4), 784–807.
- Berger, M. C., & Hirsch, B. T. (1985). Veteran status as a screening device during the Vietnam era. *Social Science Quarterly*, 66, 79–89.
- Bernstein, I. (1990). *The New York City draft riots: Their significance for American society and politics in the age of the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Boëne, B. (2003). La Professionnalisation Des Armées: Contexte Et Raisons, Impact Fonctionnel Et Sociopolitique. *Revue française de sociologie*, 44(4), 647–693. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3323232>
- Breen, R., Karlson, K. B., & Holm, A. (2018). Interpreting and understanding logits, probits, and other nonlinear probability models. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 44, 39–54.
- Brotz, H., & Wilson, E. (1946). Characteristics of military society. *American Journal of Sociology*, 51(5), 371–375.
- Campbell, C., & Pearlman, J. (2013). Period effects, cohort effects, and the narrowing gender wage gap. *Social Science Research*, 42(6), 1693–1711.
- Card, J. J. (1983). *Lives after Vietnam: The personal impact of military service*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Carlson, E., & Andress, J. (2009). Military service by twentieth-century generations of American men. *Armed Forces & Society*, 35(2), 385–400. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x08318487>
- Connelly, R., Gayle, V., & Lambert, P. S. (2016). A review of occupation-based social classifications for social survey research. *Methodological Innovations*, 9, 1–14.
- De Tray, D. (1982). Veteran status as a screening device. *The American Economic Review*, 72(1), 133–142.
- Elder, G. H., Jr. (1974). *Children of the Great Depression: Social change in life experience*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Elder, G. H., Jr., Gimbel, C., & Ivie, R. (1991). Turning points in life: The case of military service and war. *Military Psychology*, 3(4), 215–231.
- Elder, G. H., Jr., & Johnson, M. K. (2002). The life course and aging: Challenges, lessons, and new directions. In R. A. Settersten Jr. (Ed.), *Invitation to the life course: Toward new understandings of later life* (pp. 49–81). Amityville, NY: Baywood.
- Elo, I. T., & Preston, S. H. (1996). Educational differentials in mortality: United States, 1979–85. *Social Science & Medicine*, 42(1), 47–57.
- Fallows, J. (1975). What did you do in the Class War, Daddy? *Washington Monthly*, 7(8), 5–19.
- Ferraro, K. F., Shippee, T. P., & Schafer, M. H. (2009). Cumulative inequality theory for research on aging and the life course. In V. L. Bengtson, M. Silverstein, N. Putney, & D. Gans (Eds.), *Handbook of theories of aging* (pp. 413–433). New York: Springer.
- Flynn, G. Q. (1993). *The draft, 1940–1973*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Flynn, G. Q. (2002). *Conscription and democracy: The draft in France, Great Britain, and the United States*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Gangl, M. (2006). Scar effects of unemployment: An assessment of institutional complementarities. *American Sociological Review*, 71(6), 986–1013.
- Herpin, N., & Mansuy, M. (1995). Le Rôle Du Service National Dans L'insertion Des Jeunes. *Économie et statistique*, 283–284, 81–95.
- Hogan, D. P. (1981). *Transitions and social change: The early lives of American men*. New York: Academic Press.
- Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques. (1977). *Enquête: Formation, Qualification Professionnelle – 1977*. Paris: Archives de Données Issues de la Statistique Publique.
- Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques. (1985). *Enquête: Formation, Qualification Professionnelle – 1985*. Paris: Archives de Données Issues de la Statistique Publique.
- Institute of Medicine. (2010). *Returning home from Iraq and Afghanistan: Preliminary assessment of readjustment needs of veterans, service members, and their families*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
- Keller, K., Poutvaara, P., & Wagener, A. (2009). Military draft and economic growth in OECD countries. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 20(5), 373–393.
- Keller, K., Poutvaara, P., & Wagener, A. (2010). Does a military draft discourage enrollment in higher education? *Finanzarchiv*, 66(2), 97–120.
- Kriner, D. L., & Shen, F. X. (2010). *The casualty gap: The causes and consequences of American wartime inequalities*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lee, C. H. (2005). Wealth accumulation and the health of Union Army veterans, 1860–1870. *Journal of Economic History*, 65(2), 352–385.
- MacLean, A. (2008). The Cold War and modern memory: Veterans reflect on military service. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 36, 103–130.
- MacLean, A. (2010). The things they carry: Combat, disability, and unemployment among U.S. men. *American Sociological Review*, 75(4), 563–585.
- MacLean, A., & Kleykamp, M. (2016). Income inequality and the veteran experience. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 663(1), 99–116.
- MacLean, A., & Parsons, N. (2010). Unequal risk: Combat occupations in the volunteer military. *Sociological Perspectives*, 53(3), 347–372.
- Mannheim, K. (1952 [1927]). The problem of generations. In K. Mannheim (Ed.), *Essays on the sociology of knowledge*, (pp. 276–320). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.
- Martin, M. L. (1981). Le Déclin De L'armée De Masse En France: Note Sur Quelques Paramètres Organisationnels. *Revue française de sociologie*, 22(1), 87–115. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3321186>
- Maurin, E., & Xenogiani, T. (2007). Demand for education and labor market outcomes: Lessons from the abolition of compulsory conscription in France. *Journal of Human Resources*, 42(4), 795–819.
- Morgan, L. A. (1998). Glass-ceiling effect or cohort effect? A longitudinal study of the gender earnings gap for engineers, 1982 to 1989. *American Sociological Review*, 63(4), 479–493.
- Mouganie, Pierre. 2015. *Conscription and the returns to education: Evidence from a regression discontinuity*. Retrieved from <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2494651>.
- Nam, C. B. (1964). Impact of the 'Gi Bills' on the educational level of the male population. *Social Forces*, 43(1), 26–32.
- National Research Council. (2006). *Assessing fitness for military enlistment: Physical, medical, and mental health standards*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Nayback, A. M. (2008). Health disparities in military veterans with PTSD: Influential sociocultural factors. *Journal of Psychosocial Nursing and Mental Health Services*, 46(6), 41–51.
- Palloni, A. (2006). Reproducing inequalities: Luck, wallets, and the enduring effects of childhood health. *Demography*, 43(4), 587–615.
- Ryder, N. B. (1965). The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. *American Sociological Review*, 30(6), 843–861.
- Sampson, R. J., & Laub, J. H. (1996). Socioeconomic achievement in the life course of disadvantaged men: Military service as a turning point, circa 1940–1965. *American Sociological Review*, 61(3), 347–367.
- Segal, D. R., & Segal, M. W. (2004). America's military population. *Population Bulletin*, 59(4), 3–40.
- Seys, B. (1986). In INSEE (Ed.), *De L'ancien Code À La Nouvelle Nomenclature Des Catégories Socioprofessionnelles: Étude Méthodologique*. Paris, France: INSEE. Retrieved from https://www.epsilon.insee.fr/jspui/bitstream/1/25618/1/archdoc_156.pdf
- Small, D. S., & Rosenbaum, P. R. (2008). War and wages: The strength of instrumental variables and their sensitivity to unobserved biases. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 103(483), 924–933. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1198/016214507000001247>
- Smith, I., Marsh, K., & Segal, D. R. (2012). The World War II veteran advantage? A lifetime cross-sectional study of social status attainment. *Armed Forces & Society*, 38(1), 5–26. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x10390463>
- StataCorp. (2015a). *Stata 14 base reference manual*. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
- StataCorp. (2015b). *Stata statistical software: Release 14*. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.
- Stora, B. (1997). *Imaginaires De Guerre: AlgéRie, Viêt-Nam, En France Et Aux Etats-Unis*. Paris: Editions La Découverte.
- Stora, B., & Quemeneur, T. (2012). *AlgéRie, 1954–1962: Lettres, Carnets Et RéCits Des Français Et Des Algériens Dans La Guerre*. Paris: Arènes.
- Tanielian, T. L., & Jaycox, L. (2008). *Invisible wounds of war: Psychological and cognitive injuries, their consequences, and services to assist recovery*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

- 1046 Teachman, J. D., Call, V. R. A., & Segal, M. W. (1993). The selectivity of military
1047 enlistment. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 21(2),
1048 287–309.
- 1049 Teachman, J. D., & Tedrow, L. M. (2004). Wages, earnings, and occupational status:
1050 Did World War II veterans receive a premium? *Social Science Research*, 33(4),
1051 581–605.
- 1052 Teachman, J. D., & Tedrow, L. M. (2007). Joining up: Did military service in the early
1053 all volunteer era affect subsequent civilian income? *Social Science Research*,
36(4), 1447–1474.
- 1054 Vallet, L.-A. (2004). Change in intergenerational class mobility in France from the
1055 1970s to the 1990s and its explanation: An analysis following the Casmin
1056 approach. In R. Breen (Ed.), *Social mobility in Europe* (pp. 115–148). New York:
1057 Oxford University Press.
- 1058 Wimmer, A. (2013). *Waves of war: Nationalism, state formation, and ethnic exclusion
in the modern world*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 1059 Yoakum, C. S., & Yerkes, R. M. (1920). *Army mental tests*. New York: H. Holt and
1060 Company.
- 1061

UNCORRECTED PROOF